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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that courts are available to seek redress for injuries for those
who have been wronged is fundamental to American jurisprudence. Most
attorneys are familiar with the legal axiom, "[f]or every wrong, there is a
remedy."1 This principle, so simply and plainly stated, has long been part
of Florida's Constitution. Article I, section 21 states that "[t]he courts shall
be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."2 "This provision, dating from
our 1838 constitution ... guarantees to every person the right to free access
to the courts on claims of redress of injury free of unreasonable burdens and
restrictions., 3 However, statutes of limitation and statutes of repose can
extinguish a litigant's cause of action before the litigant is even aware that
a problem exists.
* Shareholder in the firm of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A.,
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1. Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 174 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.) (quoting Holland v.
Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709 (1944)), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992).
2. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
3. Id.
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It is not difficult to envision situations in which a person's injuries or
damages do not readily show themselves. The example that most often
comes to mind is a disease such as AIDS, which has a long latency period
wherein the person does not know he is afflicted.4 Such situations give rise
to constitutional challenges based on the access to courts provision in the
Florida Constitution.' Where latent injuries or damages are concerned,
however, Florida courts have eroded that principle in their more recent
pronouncements.6 This article examines the trend away from free access
to the courts and argues that these decisions pose an unfair and unprecedent-
ed threat to those whose damages do not manifest themselves in the time
required to bring suit.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE
Recently, the majority of decisions from the Florida Supreme Court in
this area construed the medical malpractice statute.7 That statute states the
following:
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years
from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within
2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event
shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the
incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued ....
In those actions covered by this paragraph in which it can be shown that
fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented
the discovery of the injury within the 4-year period, the period of
limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident
giving rise to the injury occurred
4. Another example could be a building whose design or construction flaws are not
apparent until after a limitations period has run. In public construction projects, there is often
a one-year statute of limitations for the owner to make a claim on an available bond. See
FLA. STAT. § 255.05 (1991) ("Little Miller Act").
5. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
6. See Whingham v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 613 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); see also infra notes 9-13 and
accompanying text.
8. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 18
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 19
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/19
Trohn / Trohn
The above statute contains a two-year statute of limitations and a four-
year statute of repose.9 The relationship between statutes of limitation and
statutes of repose have often been misunderstood. The Florida Supreme
Court has explained their relationship in the following manner:
A statute of limitation begins to run upon the accrual of a cause of
action except where there are provisions which defer the running of the
statute in cases of fraud or where the cause of action cannot be
reasonably discovered. On the other hand, a statute of repose, which is
usually longer in length, runs from the date of a discrete act on the part
of the defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued."
In contrast to a statute of limitation, a statute of repose precludes a right
of action after a specified time which is measured from the incident of
malpractice, sale of a product, or completion of improvements, rather
than establishing a time period within which the action must be brought
measured from the point in time when the cause of action accrued.'
When statutes of limitation or repose present a constitutional threat to
one's access to courts, courts look to the test enunciated by the Florida
Supreme Court in Kluger v. White.' 2 In Kluger, the court devised a test
that, in general, prohibits the Legislature from abolishing a person's right
of action unless an overpowering public necessity is shown. 3 The court
initially used the Kluger test liberally to grant relief to those plaintiffs whose
injuries were latent and undiscoverable."4
9. See id.
10. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 418.
11. University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1991).
12. 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
13. Id The court's test in Kluger reads as follows:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has
been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has
become a part of the common law ... pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the
Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reason-
able alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for
injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981); see
also infra notes 23-25, 33 and accompanying text.
1993]
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III. DIAMOND'S RULING
In the case of Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 5 the supreme
court was faced squarely with the constitutionality of depriving a plaintiff
of her cause of action when her injuries were undiscoverable.' 6 In
Diamond, the plaintiff alleged that while yet unborn, a drug manufactured
by the defendant was administered to her.'" This drug was later found to
be a cause of cancer in those children whose mothers were treated with the
drug.'" The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the statute
of repose that existed for products liability suits.' 9 That statute, section
95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes, provided that no products liability action
could be brought within twelve years after delivery of the product "regard-
less of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have
been discovered. '2 In this case, the effect of the ingestion of the drug did
not materialize until after the plaintiff reached puberty. 2' As pointed out
in Justice McDonald's concurrence,
[The plaintiff] had an accrued cause of action but it was not recogniz-
able, through no fault of hers, because the injury had not manifested
itself. This is different from a situation where the injury is not inflicted
for more than twelve years from the sale of the product. When an
injury has occurred but a cause of action cannot be pursued because the
results of the injury could not be discovered, a statute of limitation
barring the action does, in my judgment, bar access to the courts and is
constitutionally impermissive.22
The court held that the statute of limitation, as applied in that case,
violated the plaintiffs guarantee of access to courts. 23 Although the court
did not specifically use the Kluger test, it was influenced by an earlier
decision that applied the test wherein the plaintiff was allowed to sue a
building contractor after the statute of repose had run.24
15. 397 So. 2d at 671.
16. Id. at 672.
17. Id. at 671.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Diamond, 397 So. 2d at 672 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1977))..
21. Id.
22. Id. (McDonald, J., concurring).
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)); see
American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West & Conyers, Architects & Eng'rs, 491 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d
[Vol. 18
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IV. DELAYED "INJURY" VS. DELAYED
"DISCOVERY OF INJURY"
A critical distinction must be drawn between factual situations wherein
the plaintiff has, in fact, been injured but her injuries remain undiscovered,
and those situations wherein the plaintiff does not become injured until after
the statute of limitation or repose has run. The Florida Supreme Court
recognized this distinction when it passed on the constitutionality of the
products liability statute of repose in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.25  In
Pullum, the plaintiff was injured while operating a press brake machine in
1977, and subsequently filed suit against the manufacturer in 1988, which
was past the statute of repose then governed by Florida Statutes section
95.031(2).26 In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court
found that the Legislature, in enacting the statute of repose, reasonably
decided that perpetual liability places an undue burden on manufacturers.27
However, in an important footnote, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
the critical distinction between the injuries in Pullum, and those suffered in
Diamond. Specifically, the court stated:
In Diamond, we held that the operation of section 95.031(2) operated
to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the
aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts. But Diamond presents an
entirely different factual context than existed in either Battilla or the
present case where the product first inflicted injury many years after its
sale. In Diamond, the defective product, a drug known as diethylstil-
bestrol produced by Squibb, was ingested during plaintiff mother's
pregnancy shortly after purchase of the drug between 1955-1956. The
drug's effects, however, did not become manifest until after plaintiff
daughter reached puberty. Under these circumstances, if the statute
applied, plaintiffs' claim would have been barred even though the injury
caused by the product did not become evident until over twelve years
Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Opponents of the Diamond decision would argue that Overlandapplied
the Kluger test to a statute of repose wherein no strong public interest was specifically
expressed. A strong public interest was subsequently expressed in the preamble to the new
section 95.11(3)(c), wherein the Legislature specifically found the people's best interest
would be served by limiting potential liability to an engineer, architect, or contractor.
25. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986), supercededby
statute as provided in Smith v. Sturm. 510 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
26. Id. at 658; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Later cases decided by
the District Courts of Appeal specifically recognized that section 95.031(2) superseded
Pullum. See, e.g., Sturm, 510 So. 2d at 345.
27. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659.
1993]
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after the product had been ingested. The legislature, no doubt, did not
contemplate the application of this statute to the facts in Diamond.
Were it applicable, there certainly would have been a denial of access
to the courts. 8
Despite the Diamond decision and the Pullum footnote, the court in
recent decisions dealing with the medical malpractice statute of limitation
and repose has apparently ignored, or overlooked, the distinction to be
drawn by these cases.
V. RECENT DECISIONS
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the medical
malpractice statute of repose in Carr v. Broward County.29 In Carr, the
parents of a brain-damaged newborn child brought suit after the statute of
repose had run.3" Plaintiffs alleged that, despite due diligence, they were
unable to discover the circumstances surrounding the prenatal and obstetrical
care rendered during birth.3 The court upheld the defendant's motion to
dismiss based on the statute of repose and specifically ruled that the statute
was constitutional under the Kluger test.32 The court cited the extensive
preamble to the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 wherein the
requisite public necessity was expressed.3
28. Id. at n.*.
29. 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989). Contra Public Health Trust v. Menendez, 584 So. 2d
567 (Fla. 1991).
30. Carr, 541 So. 2d at 93.
31. Id
32. Id. at 94.
33. Id. A portion of the preamble states:
WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance
for doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few
months; and
WHEREAS, the consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens
created by the high cost of insurance; and
WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced to
curtail their practices, retire, or practice defensive medicine at increased cost to
the citizens of Florida; and
WHEREAS, the problem has reached crisis proportion in Florida, NOW
THEREFORE ....
Id. (quoting Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-79, § 7, 1975 Fla. Laws 13,
20 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b))).
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Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court passed on the constitutional-
ity of the statute of repose in Kush v. Lloyd.34 In Kush, the parents of a
deformed child were referred by their physician for genetic testing.3' The
parents were subsequently assured that they possessed no genetic abnormali-
ties and that their first son's impairment was an accident of nature, not a
genetic defect. However, the results of an important study were never
transmitted, and the parents eventually had another deformed child.36 The
parents filed suit after the statute of repose had run. 37 The court held that
the statute of repose begins to run from the date of the negligence, not from
the date of birth.38
More important, neither the Kush decision nor the Carr decision
involved injuries that were latent. In both cases, the injuries were readily
apparent and the issue involved the time of discovering negligence, as
opposed to the time of discovering the injuries.39 Therefore, neither the
Kush nor the Carr decision overruled or even confronted the Diamond
decision.4" Nevertheless, recent decisions in the district courts have relied
on the Kush and Carr decisions in precluding from suit those plaintiffs who
did not realize they were injured during the period of repose.
In Whigham v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.,4 the
plaintiff received AIDS tainted blood during a transfusion administered by
the defendant. After the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose had
run, the plaintiff discovered that he had been infected with the AIDS
virus.42 The plaintiff was completely asymptomatic until that point.43
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action, based on the statute of repose." The court relied on Carr, Kush,
and other recent Florida Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitu-
tionality of the medical malpractice statute of repose.45 The supreme
court's Diamond decision was specifically not followed, as the court was
34. 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992).
35. Id. at 417.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 418.
39. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
41. 613 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1993).
42. Id. at 111.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 114.
45. Id. at 112-13.
1993]
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more inclined to follow the "more recent pronouncements from the Supreme
Court."46
Under a similar fact situation, Doe v. Shands Teaching Hospital &
Clinics, Inc., the First District Court of Appeal again ruled that the plaintiff
was not denied constitutional access to courts. 7 In Doe, the First District
Court of Appeal considered the applicability of Diamond to the case.4
The court reasoned that Diamond was inapplicable as the statute of repose
in that case was not effective at the time the plaintiff ingested the drug.49
The court reasoned that Kush had the opportunity to address Diamond but
did not and, therefore, Diamond might be limited to its facts."
The district court overlooked the more likely reason that Diamond was
not confronted in the latest Florida Supreme Court cases, namely, the fact
that Kush is factually distinguishable from Diamond. As Justice Kogan
observed in his dissent of the Kush decision, prior decisions have failed to
focus adequately on the distinction between delayed discovery and delayed
injury." In Kush, the injury was delayed until after the repose period had
run.52 In Diamond, the injuries were immediate, but discovery of the
injuries was delayed until after the repose period had run. 3 Diamond is
the only Florida Supreme Court decision with facts which are similar to
those presented in Whigham and Doe. 4 The First District Court's reliance
on cases that are factually distinguishable is misplaced, thus resulting in
decisions which are unprecedented. 5 Furthermore, in his dissent in Doe,
Judge Ervin felt that a judicial determination of overpowering public
necessity could not be made under the factual situation wherein a plaintiff
neither knows nor was able to know of the injury until after the repose
period had elapsed. 6
46. Whigham, 613 So. 2d at 113.
47. 614 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,_ So. 2d (Fla. 1993).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1171.
50. Id.
51. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 426 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
52. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
55. Doe, 614 So. 2d at 1172 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1177.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., a statute of repose that barred
a cause of action to a plaintiff who was unaware of his injury prior to the
expiration of the repose period was held to be unconstitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court.57 Despite the fact that no subsequent supreme
court decision has receded from Diamond, recent district court opinions have
mistakenly found that persons with latent injuries, discovered after the
statute of repose has expired, have not been denied their access to the
courts. These decisions rely on supreme court cases that are factually
distinguishable from Diamond. Although the public necessity for a repose
period in the medical malpractice context may be shown, the Legislature has
not expressed an overpowering public necessity as it relates to people with
latent or undiscoverable injuries. As the supreme court has stated, "[t]he
legislature, no doubt, did not contemplate the application of this statute to
the facts in Diamond.01 Until the Florida Supreme Court decides differ-
ently, district courts should follow the ruling in Diamond and allow these
litigants to pursue their claims as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.
57. Diamond, 397 So. 2d at 672.
58. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475
U.S. 1114 (1986), supercededby statute as provided in Smith v. Sturm, 510 So. 2d 343, 345
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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